United Nations S/2016/490

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 June 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 26 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to the Security Council an official communiqué dated 24 May 2016 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of my country, setting out the Government's official position on the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ignace **Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 26 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Official communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has been following with great concern statements made by the representatives of certain partners relating to the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Ministry notes with regret that these statements concern domestic political issues and are increasingly accompanied by threats of sanctions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation wishes in this regard to make the following clarification:

(a) The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a State governed by the rule of law. The Government is therefore under an obligation to enforce the country's laws and regulations, in order to ensure law and order, tranquillity and security for all, essential conditions for the enjoyment of other fundamental human rights. It cannot allow abuses of rights that are harmful to Congolese society.

(b) In view of the equality of all citizens before the law, and to avoid anarchy and chaos, the Government ensures that efforts to combat impunity are the rule, in all circumstances, regardless of the criminal acts involved or the positions held by their perpetrators. This is a matter of respect for the Constitution and for ethical standards in public affairs. Construing it as an attempt to narrow the political space would be a mistake.

(c) The Government will continue to work tirelessly to ensure that all citizens enjoy their guaranteed fundamental rights, but in strict compliance with the laws and regulations. In this connection, it should be noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most advanced countries in Africa in the area of respect for and promotion of public freedoms, including freedom of the press, freedom of expression and other civil and political rights, both collective and individual.

(d) The use by certain partners of language larded with threats is not only morally indefensible, in view of its arbitrary nature and selective application in the region, but also — and most especially — contrary to international law, which prohibits both interference in the internal affairs of other States and the use or threat of use of force, in any form. Such conduct undermines the sovereignty of the States concerned, in the present instance the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is also counterproductive, in light of the spirit of constructive dialogue that partners who are respectful of the values and principles that govern international relations, as mandated by the Charter of the United Nations, should maintain.

(e) As for the election process, the delay is primarily due to two major causes: the lack of reliable and inclusive electoral lists, and the lack of consensus on the election timetable. In the first case, a solution is in sight with the launching of the pilot test and the forthcoming acquisition of the necessary material. In the latter case, the purpose of the dialogue initiated by the Head of State is to reach a

consensus on a comprehensive timetable for the election, as the opposition has rejected all the timetables issued previously by the Independent National Electoral Commission. Rather than engaging in invective and accusations of ulterior motives, loyal partners should be expected candidly and effectively to support the Commission and the national political dialogue.

Done at Kinshasa, on 24 May 2016

(*Signed*) Raymond **Tshibanda N'tungamulongo**
Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

United Nations S/2016/491

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 June 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 26 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to the following:

Since March 2011, when the Syrian regime decided to resort to repression against its people after they came out in a peaceful popular revolution to demand their legitimate rights, that regime has insisted on following criminal and irresponsible policies and on twisting and falsifying the facts. It has tried to hold the international community responsible for its own crimes and failed policies, which are a blight on humanity. It has also tried to tar States such as Qatar, which support the rights of the Syrian people, with the brush of terrorism. The regime has addressed numerous letters to the United Nations that teem with utterly baseless allegations and lies, including those dated 4 May 2016 (S/2016/415) and 23 May 2016 (S/2016/464).

The State of Qatar categorically rejects all the allegations contained in the letters of the Representative of the Syrian regime and should like to reiterate the following:

- The State of Qatar condemns all terrorist acts against civilians and reaffirms its unwavering commitment to fighting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, whatever its source. Qatar also reaffirms that it is committed to addressing that phenomenon and supporting regional and international efforts to bring stability and security to the region and throughout the world. It notes that terrorism has increased in Syria as a result of the regime's brutal aggression against the Syrian people, and also because it cooperates with and supports terrorist groups for its own survival.
- The regime has followed a policy of murder, terrorism, siege of cities, air attacks on civilians, and destruction of schools, houses of worship, hospitals and medical facilities. It attacks medical personnel and humanitarian workers, and obstructs the delivery of medical supplies to the sick and those in need. Those actions unequivocally demonstrate the terrorist nature of that regime and its abiding contempt for all moral, humanitarian and legal standards.
- The State of Qatar's efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria are animated by its commitment to upholding the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments that support the right of

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peoples to self-determination and a life of dignity, and protect human rights, while preserving Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Qatar's efforts are also animated by its categorical rejection of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and are based on the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and various United Nations bodies, and international law.

- The State of Qatar reaffirms its support for a political solution to the crisis in Syria based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 and the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers that meets the Syrian people's aspirations while preserving Syria's unity and sovereignty. Because it believes in a political solution, the State of Qatar has taken part in all the international meetings on the Syrian crisis, from the 2012 Geneva meeting to the May 2016 meeting just held in Vienna by the International Syria Support Group, of which Qatar is an active member.

- The State of Qatar reaffirms its commitment to continued cooperation with the United Nations and the international community to support and assist the Syrian people and bring an end to their suffering.

Finally, today is the fourth anniversary of the atrocious criminal massacre committed by the Syrian regime's shabbiha militias in the town of Hulah, where dozens of innocent civilians were massacred, including women, children and elderly persons. The State of Qatar recalls that horrific massacre, as well as hundreds of others carried out by the regime, with great pain. It once again calls on the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to take all measures necessary to protect Syrian civilians from crimes perpetrated by the Syrian regime, and to do everything necessary to hold accountable all those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity to ensure that the perpetrators do not escape punishment under the international justice system.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alya Ahmed Saif **Al-Thani**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/70/908–S/2016/492

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 May 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 120
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 25 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from Robert Fico, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, nominating Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations (see annex).

I would like to kindly ask your assistance in circulating the present letter with the attached biography and vision statement of Mr. Lajčák among the distinguished Member States of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) František **Ružička**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 25 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 25 May 2016 from the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations, with reference to General Assembly resolution 69/321 adopted on 11 September 2015 and in connection with the joint letter of the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council dated 15 December 2015 (A/70/623-S/2015/988), I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Slovak Republic has decided to nominate Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Slovakia is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as enshrined in its Charter. As one of the 193 Member States, my country fully and actively participates in the work of the United Nations, its organs, funds and programmes. Effective multilateralism has always been among the cornerstones of Slovakia's foreign policy.

The challenges and threats that the international community currently faces call for intensification of our collective efforts aimed at reaching consensual solutions and effective implementation of reached agreements. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, among others, is essential nowadays. The role of the United Nations and of its Secretary-General is indispensable in that regard.

As stipulated by the General Assembly in its resolution 69/321, Member States are invited to present candidates with proven leadership and managerial skills, extensive experience in international relations and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills. In the same spirit, the Government of the Slovak Republic has decided to nominate its Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák.

Mr. Lajčák has dedicated his entire professional career to international relations and diplomacy. In addition to representing Czechoslovakia and Slovakia abroad, he served as Assistant to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans (1999-2001), as Personal Representative of the European Union's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy for the Referendum on the Independence of Montenegro (2006), as High Representative of the International Community and European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007-2009) and as Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia in the European External Action Service (2010-2012).

He is currently in his third mandate as Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. He was reappointed to that position by the President of the Slovak Republic on 23 March 2016, following the recent parliamentary elections in Slovakia.

It gives me great pleasure to recommend Mr. Lajčák for the kind consideration of all Member States as a highly qualified and experienced candidate for the position of the next Secretary-General of the United Nations. As ever, he is dedicated to fulfilling his duties and responsibilities in that regard with utmost professionalism and commitment.

The curriculum vitae of Mr. Lajčák is attached to the present letter (see enclosure).

I kindly request that the present letter and its enclosure be brought to the attention of all United Nations Member States.

(*Signed*) Robert **Fico**
Prime Minister

Enclosure

Curriculum vitae*

Miroslav Lajčák (Slovak Republic)

Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Miroslav Lajčák (53) is a career diplomat who has spent his whole professional life working in diplomatic service — both of his own country and in international institutions. His personal credo is professionalism and responsibility. He considers dialogue and respect to be the main instruments of diplomacy. He believes in cooperation and inclusiveness.

He is known as an attentive listener, determined mediator and capable manager, who has experience with conflict resolution and conflict prevention at the national and international levels. He is a strong believer in multilateralism and respect for rules. During his career, he played an active role in mediating the post-conflict crises in the Western Balkans and in the transformation of his country (which was established after the peaceful split of Czechoslovakia), as well as in building the diplomatic service of the European Union.

He is currently serving his third term as Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic.

National Diplomatic Career

He is a graduate of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. After completing his university studies by obtaining a law degree at the Comenius University in Bratislava, he joined the Foreign Service of the then Czechoslovakia in 1988. In 1991, he was posted to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow as an Assistant to the Ambassador. When Czechoslovakia split in 1992, he continued in the same position at the Slovak Embassy in Moscow.

Upon his return to Slovakia in 1993 to the newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, he took an active part in forming the national Foreign Service. He became Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister and later on, Director of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister.

In 1994 he was appointed Slovak Ambassador to Japan, becoming the youngest-ever Head of Diplomatic Mission of Slovakia. At the age of 31, he was also the youngest foreign ambassador in Japan.

In 1998, after his posting to Japan, he returned to the Foreign Ministry to become for the second time Director of Foreign Minister's Cabinet. In 2001, he was appointed Slovak Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001-2005). During this time, he deepened his knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the Western Balkans. In recognition of his active engagement in this complex region, he was awarded the highest state award of the former Yugoslavia.

* Curricula vitae are issued without formal editing.

Following his term in Belgrade, he was named Political Director at the Foreign Ministry (2005-2007). During this period, he was also designated Head of the Secretariat preparing the Summit of the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America, held in Bratislava in February 2005. In this capacity, he was in charge of liaising and coordinating — on behalf of the Slovak State authorities — with both presidential administrations and making sure that the Bush-Putin Summit in Slovakia was well prepared in terms of organization and logistics.

Government Experience

In January 2009, he was called — as a career diplomat not affiliated to any political party — to join the Slovak coalition government in the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He held the post until July 2010.

From April 2012 to March 2016, during the term of office of the next government, he held the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs — again as a professional diplomat with no party affiliation. In addition, he became Chairman of the Government's Council for Human Rights, National Minorities and Gender Equality. In that capacity, he successfully headed and completed an unprecedented and inclusive process of preparing and adopting the first-ever nationwide Strategy for Supporting and Protecting Human Rights in Slovakia in 2015, managing a consensus of minority and disadvantaged groups among various interests from human rights and minority representatives, political parties and churches.

In March 2016, he was elected as a Member of Parliament and received the sixth highest number of preferential votes in the whole country. On 23 March 2016, he was reappointed Minister of Foreign and European Affairs in the newly formed coalition government, holding this government portfolio for the third time. One of his main tasks in this term is the preparation of the country for the rotating Presidency of Slovakia in the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2016.

International Career

His international engagements started in 1999 when he served as the Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, Eduard Kukan (until 2001).

In 2006, the European Union High Representative for Common and Security Policy Javier Solana entrusted him — on behalf of the European Union — with organizing and supervising the referendum on the independence of Montenegro in 2006. In a highly polarized environment with a divided public and an antagonized political scene, he negotiated and designed the rules for the referendum. He did this in an inclusive dialogue with all the parties and in a transparent manner. This led to the only process of the establishment of national independence on the territory of former Yugoslavia under direct European Union auspices in a consensual and democratic way, without the bloodshed or conflicts so frequent in that region. The result was neither rejected nor questioned by anyone subsequently.

In 2007, he was appointed High Representative of the International Community and European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He had to help to steer a country paralyzed by ethnic divisions and

mutual distrust among its entities. In this capacity, he managed an extensive, multinational staff of several hundred people and a multi-million-dollar budget. With a mandate from the Security Council, he liaised regularly with the United Nations and reported periodically to the Security Council. During his tenure, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union — the most remarkable integration success of the country for many years to come. He also launched activities to reach out to the population, including speaking tours and a website for dialogue with citizens. His concerted efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina earned him the title "Personality of the Year", awarded to him independently in all three Bosnia and Herzegovina entities, in 2007. He left Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2009 after being nominated to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.

In 2010-2012, he served as Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia in the newly formed diplomatic service of the European Union — European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels. Again, he took an active part in building up a completely new service — this time an international one. He was engaged in setting the rules for its operation and managing numerous multinational staff. In this position, he participated in forming European Union policy and the European Union's ties with important neighbours to the East and South-East. One of his first political missions was to mediate the political crisis in Albania and bring the governing and opposition parties to the negotiating table in order to de-escalate tensions after deadly clashes in Tirana in early 2011. In parallel to the position of the EEAS Managing Director, he also acted as the European Union's Chief Negotiator for the Association Agreements of the European Union with Ukraine and with the Republic of Moldova, as well as the European Union Representative in the "5+2" Talks on the Transnistria Settlement. In recognition of his role, he was awarded the highest state award of the Republic of Moldova.

Public Profile

He is active in the academic world, as well as in the traditional and social media. He is often invited to give lectures or participate in discussions at leading international universities (for example, John Hopkins University, University of Berkeley, Moscow Institute of International Relations, Chinese Diplomatic Academy, London School of Economics, Bocconi University Milan, etc.), think tanks or foundations (Atlantic Council, GMF, Friends of Europe Brussels, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Berlin, International Peace Institute, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) Paris, etc.).

His opinions and comments are asked for, published or quoted in international media (Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Economist, Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Diplomatico — Portugal, Daily Nation — Kenya, etc.).

He speaks English, Russian, German, all Slavic languages of the Balkans, Bulgarian and French.

He is married and has 2 daughters. His wife Jarmila, a popular TV journalist, is also well-known for dedicating a lot of her time to charities.

Professional Career

March 23, 2016-present	Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
April 2012-March 2016	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
December 2010-April 2012	Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia, European External Action Service, Brussels
January 2009-July 2010	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
July 2007-January 2009	High Representative/European Union Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo
2006	Personal Representative of the European Union High Representative for Common and Security Policy to facilitate the referendum on the independence of Montenegro
2005-2007	Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava
2005	Head of the Permanent Secretariat for the Organization of the Summit of Presidents of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the United States of America, George W. Bush, held in Bratislava in February 2005
2001-2005	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro), Republic of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
1999-2001	Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, Eduard Kukan
1998-2001	Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
1994-1998	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to Japan
1993-1994	Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
	Director of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic
1991-1993	Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Moscow, Russian Federation (from 1 January 1993 Embassy of the Slovak Republic)
1988-1991	Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Prague

Education

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Faculty of International Relations

Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law

College of International and Security Studies George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

Foreign Language Skills

English, Russian, German, Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian/Montenegrin, Bulgarian, French

Honours and Awards

Order of the Yugoslav Star, 1st Class (2005)

Order of Honour of the Republic of Moldova (2014)

Order of the Montenegrin Great Star (2016)

Activities

European Council on Foreign Relations — Council Member

Friends of Europe/Les Amis de l'Europe — Board of Trustees Member

United Nations S/2016/493

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 May 2016

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016) and 2280 (2016),

Expressing grave alarm and concern regarding the conflict between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and opposition forces which emanated from internal political disputes among the country's political and military leaders that has resulted in great human suffering, including significant loss of life, displacement of more than 2 million people, and the loss of property, further impoverishing and disadvantaging the people of South Sudan,

Welcoming the signing of the "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan" ("the Agreement") as contained in S/2016/654 and *further welcoming* the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) on 29 April 2016 as a vital step towards the full implementation of the Agreement and *also welcoming* the remarks of both President Salva Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar on the need to ensure reconciliation and a spirit of cooperation,

Urging the TGNU to fully and unconditionally implement all parts of the Agreement, uphold the permanent ceasefire and address the economic crisis and dire humanitarian situation,

Welcoming the establishment of the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission and its work towards implementing ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, and the commencement of the Strategic Defence and Security Review, and *noting* the positive meeting and dialogue of military and police representatives in Juba at the conference held on 12-14 May 2016,

Welcoming the support of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and the African Union through its High Representative for South Sudan, former President Alpha Oumar Konaré, for the formation of the TGNU and *calling upon* the TGNU to extend its full cooperation and support to the JMEC Chair, former President Festus Mogae, for implementation of the Agreement,

Strongly condemning past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving targeted killings of civilians, ethnically targeted violence, extrajudicial killings, rape, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in

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armed conflict, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, and attacks on schools, places of worship and hospitals, as well as United Nations and associated peacekeeping personnel and objects, by all parties, including armed groups and national security forces, as well as the incitement to commit such abuses and violations, *further condemning* harassment and targeting of civil society, humanitarian personnel and journalists, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights must be held accountable, and that South Sudan's TGNU bears the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,

Expressing deep concern over the large-scale displacement of persons and deepening humanitarian crisis, *noting* the finding in the final report of the South Sudan Panel of Experts (S/2016/70), established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2206 (2015), that obstruction of humanitarian access is widespread and that parts of numerous states of South Sudan are entirely blocked from humanitarian relief, *stressing* the responsibility borne by all parties to the conflict for the suffering of the people of South Sudan, and in this regard, *recognizes* that in accordance with the Agreement, the TGNU shall review the Non-Governmental Organizations Bill, and submit the legislation to a process of public consultation to ensure that such legislation is consistent with international best practice and with its commitment to create an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection,

Commending United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners for their efforts to provide urgent and coordinated support to the population, *calling upon* all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, the full, safe, and unhindered access of relief personnel, equipment and supplies to all those in need and the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees, *condemning* all attacks against humanitarian personnel and facilities and *recalling* that attacks against humanitarian personnel and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival may amount to violations of international humanitarian law,

Taking note of the December 2015 UN Panel of Experts' Report (S/2016/70), which, inter alia, notes violations of the Agreement's permanent ceasefire by the parties, including after the signing of the Agreement, the ever-worsening humanitarian catastrophe, widespread human rights violations and abuses, and government violations of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) status-of-forces agreement, and *noting* the finding in the Panel of Experts Final Report that, while it is not a violation of the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015), both sides have continued to acquire arms and military equipment after the signing of the Agreement and *noting* that such acquisitions undermine the implementation of the Agreement by facilitating violations of the permanent ceasefire,

Welcoming the resolve indicated in the IGAD Council of Ministers Communiqué of 31 January 2016, *urging* the TGNU to abide by and take no action inconsistent with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 30-31 January 2016 communiqué, which was subsequently endorsed by the parties and JMEC, on the

issue of the Presidential Decree on the creation of 28 new states and calling on the United Nations Security Council to support consequences in the event the South Sudanese parties fail or refuse to implement the Peace Agreement, and *further welcoming* its demand that the parties to the conflict take immediate action to ensure unconditional humanitarian access across the country,

Welcoming also the 29 January 2016 AU PSC communiqué which, inter alia, called on all South Sudanese parties to abide scrupulously by the terms of the Agreement and implement faithfully its provisions, called on all African Union (AU) Member States and partners to fully support the implementation of the Agreement, and urged the international community to lend support towards the implementation of the Agreement in a coordinated manner,

Welcoming the 26 September 2015 AU PSC communiqué, which, inter alia, expressed the AU's commitment, both through the High Representative for South Sudan and the AU High Level ad hoc Committee on South Sudan, to fully play its role in the implementation process, together with IGAD, the United Nations and other concerned international stakeholders,

Also welcoming the 22 May 2015 AU PSC press statement, which, inter alia, underlined the particular relevance of resolution 2206 (2015), in order to support the search for an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan,

Recalling the AU PSC Communiqués dated 12 June 2014, 5 December 2014 and 29 January 2015 which, inter alia, stressed that sanctions will be imposed against all parties that continue to obstruct the political process and undermine the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 23 January 2014, and *further recalling* the AU PSC Communiqué dated 26 September 2015 expressing determination to impose measures against all those who would impede the implementation of the Agreement and the AU PSC Communiqué dated 29 January 2016 which recalls previous AU PSC Communiqués and press statements on South Sudan,

Further recalling the communiqué of the 28th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which inter alia, invited collective action as appropriate by the States of IGAD to enact asset freezes and travel bans, and deny the supply of arms and ammunition and any other material that could be used in war and called on the AU PSC and United Nations Security Council, and the international community to render all possible assistance in the implementation of such action,

Welcoming the China-mediated "Five-Point Plan" that was agreed upon during the Special Consultation in Support of IGAD-led South Sudan Peace Process convened on 12 January 2015 in Khartoum, and *strongly urging* the TGNU to immediately implement the Five-Point Plan,

Expressing its deep appreciation for the actions taken by UNMISS peacekeepers and troop- and police-contributing countries to protect civilians, including foreign nationals, under threat of physical violence and to stabilize the security situation,

Recognizing the importance of independent and public human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting for its useful role in laying the groundwork for justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities,

Taking note with interest of the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS, the Secretary-General, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),

Expressing grave concern that, according to the 11 March 2016 "Report of Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Assessment Mission to Improve Human Rights, Accountability, Reconciliations and Capacity in South Sudan" and the UNMISS/OHCHR 4 December 2015 report "The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan", the scale, intensity and severity of human rights violations and abuses have increased with the continuation of hostilities, that there continue to be reasonable grounds to believe that violations and abuses of human rights, including those involving extrajudicial killings, rape and other acts of sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention, as well as violations of international humanitarian law have been committed, which may amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, and *stressing* the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in South Sudan and to bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes,

Welcoming the release of the AU Commission of Inquiry (AU COI) report on South Sudan and the Separate Opinion, and *recognizing* the AU COI's work in investigating and documenting violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law in South Sudan and *expressing grave concern* at the AU COI's finding that it has reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes such as murder, outrages upon personal dignity such as rape and other acts of sexual violence, and cruel and degrading treatment, targeting of civilian objects and protected property have occurred and that violations were carried out by both sides to the conflict,

Emphasizing its hope that this and other reporting will be considered, as appropriate, by the mechanisms on transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing as called for in Chapter V of the Agreement, including the hybrid court and the Commission for Truth, Healing, and Reconciliation, *stressing* the importance of accountability, reconciliation, and healing among all South Sudanese communities as prominent elements of a transitional agenda, while also *taking note* of the important role international investigations, and where appropriate, prosecutions can play with respect to holding those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity,

Strongly condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating sexual violence against a particular ethnic group, which has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and *calling on* the TGNU to take appropriate measures to address such activity, and further *urging* all parties to desist from these actions and instead contribute to promoting peace and reconciliation among the communities,

Recognizing the important role played by civil society organizations, faith leaders, women, and youth in South Sudan, *underscoring* the importance of their participation — along with the former SPLM detainees and other political parties — to finding a sustainable solution to the crisis in the country, and concerned by efforts of some TGNU officials to limit such participation including by increased restrictions of freedom of expression,

Reaffirming all its relevant resolutions on women, peace, and security, on children and armed conflict, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as resolutions 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, resolution 2150 (2014) on the Prevention and Fight against Genocide, resolution 2151 (2014) on security sector reform, and resolution 2286 (2016) on protection of humanitarian and health-care personnel and facilities,

Recalling resolutions 1209 (1998) and 2117 (2013), and 2220 (2015) and *expressing grave concern* at the threat to peace and security in South Sudan arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and *emphasizing* the importance of strengthening efforts to combat the illicit circulation of such weapons,

Recalling the Informal Working Group on General issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms,

Noting the Agreement's call for South Sudan's political leaders to establish effective leadership and to commit themselves to the fight against corruption,

Reiterating its concern at persistent restrictions placed upon the movement and operations of UNMISS, *strongly condemning* the attacks by government and opposition forces and other groups on United Nations and IGAD personnel and facilities, and the detentions and kidnappings of United Nations and associated personnel and *calling upon* the Government of South Sudan to complete its investigations of these attacks in a swift and thorough manner and to hold those responsible to account,

Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Endorses* the "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan" (the "Agreement");

2. *Welcomes* the formation of the TGNU on 29 April 2016 as a vital step towards the full implementation of the Agreement;

3. *Expresses deep concern* at the failures of South Sudan's leaders to fully implement their commitments pursuant to the Agreement, and to bring an end to the hostilities and, further, *condemns* the continued and flagrant violations of the ceasefire provisions of the Agreement, including violations as documented by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Mechanism;

4. *Demands* that South Sudan's leaders fully and immediately adhere to the permanent ceasefire in accordance with their obligations under the Agreement, and allow in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and the UN guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to help ensure timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need;

5. *Reiterates* that there is no military solution to the conflict;

Targeted Sanctions

6. *Underscores* its willingness to impose targeted sanctions in order to support the search for an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan, including through the timely and full implementation of the Agreement;

7. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2017 the travel and financial measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015);

8. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals, and that the provisions of paragraph 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals and entities, as designated for such measures by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2206 (2015) ("the Committee"), as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan;

9. *Underscores* that such actions or policies as described in paragraph 8 above may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Agreement;

(b) Actions or policies that threaten transitional agreements or undermine the political process in South Sudan;

(c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in South Sudan;

(d) The targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual and gender-based violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law;

(e) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan;

(f) The obstruction of the activities of international peacekeeping, diplomatic, or humanitarian missions in South Sudan, including the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism or of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance;

(g) Attacks against United Nations missions, international security presences, or other peacekeeping operations, or humanitarian personnel; or

(h) Acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an individual or entity designated by the Committee;

10. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals, as designated for such measures by the Committee, who are leaders of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition,

militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 8 and 9 above;

Sanctions Committee/Panel of Experts

11. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, international and regional and subregional organizations, as well as UNMISS, as may be necessary, in particular neighbouring and regional States, in order to ensure the full implementation of the measures in this resolution, and in that regard encourages the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members;

12. *Decides* to extend until 1 July 2017 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 2206 (2015) and this paragraph, *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 31 May 2017, and decides that the Panel should carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 8 and 9 above;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, with particular focus on the benchmarks outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 below;

(c) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to individuals and entities undermining implementation of the Agreement or participating in acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable;

(d) Provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 1 December 2016, a final report by 1 May 2017, and except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month;

(e) Also to provide to the Council a report within 120 days providing analysis of the current security threats facing the TGNU, and its needs to maintain law and order in South Sudan, as well as further analysis on the role of transfers of arms and related materiel coming into South Sudan since the formation of the TGNU with respect to implementation of the Agreement and threats to UNMISS and other UN and international humanitarian personnel;

(f) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by this resolution, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of reasons for listing;

13. *Calls upon* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;

14. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

Review

15. *Expresses* its intent to monitor and review the situation at 90 day intervals from the adoption of this resolution or more frequently, as needed, and *invites* the JMEC to share relevant information with the Council, as appropriate, on its assessment of the parties' implementation of the Agreement, adherence to the permanent ceasefire, and facilitation of humanitarian access, also *expresses* its intent to impose any sanctions that may be appropriate to respond to the situation, which may include an arms embargo and the designation of senior individuals responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan, including by impeding the implementation of the Agreement, or by failing to take effective and comprehensive steps to cause forces under direct or indirect control to cease military operations, acts of violence, as well as human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law, and to enable full access for humanitarian assistance;

16. *Affirms* also that it shall be prepared to adjust the measures contained in this resolution, including by strengthening through additional measures, as well as modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the peace, accountability, and reconciliation process, and in light of the implementation of the Agreement and the parties' commitments, including the ceasefire, and compliance with this and other applicable resolutions;

17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2016/494

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 May 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 27 May 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the thirty-second monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The report covers the period from 22 April to 23 May 2016.

With respect to the destruction of the chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, the security situation continues to prevent access to the hangar that remains to be destroyed. For the same reason, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still unable to confirm the condition of two other stationary above-ground facilities. However, I note that although the Syrian Arab Republic was exploring the possibility of safely accessing one of the two above-ground facilities, the frequently changing security situation has limited plans to that end.

With respect to the initial declaration and subsequent submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic, the Director-General of OPCW and representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic met in The Hague from 27 to 30 April 2016, with the aim of resolving all outstanding issues in that regard. A visit by a team from the OPCW Technical Secretariat will take place in Damascus from 30 May to 3 June 2016, and will engage not only on issues that remain to be resolved, but also on the most recent analytical results of samples collected by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team during its visit to the Syrian Arab Republic in January 2016. I note, in particular, the fact that the Director-General has indicated that these results have increased the scope of issues that remain to be resolved. I also note that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is continuing to engage in dialogue and to cooperate with OPCW on this matter.

I underscore my continuing and grave concern over allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I note that the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is continuing to study all available information related to such allegations.

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism is proceeding with the investigation of the nine selected cases. During the reporting period, the Leadership Panel met with officials in Washington, D.C. The Mechanism's investigators also undertook their second technical visit to Damascus. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is continuing to cooperate with the Mechanism. Information and material received in

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Damascus are under review and the Mechanism has continued to receive information relevant to its investigation from other Member States.

In addition, and in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2235 (2015), the Mechanism has engaged with non-governmental organizations and other entities with knowledge about the nine cases under investigation. The Mechanism will present a written progress report to the Security Council for its consideration during the month of June 2016.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and the United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 22 April 2016 to 23 May 2016 and also covers the reporting requirements of the Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet Üzümcü

Enclosure

Note by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2 (f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) noting the Director-General's intent to include reports of the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), along with information on the Council's discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled "Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director General's intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.

4. This, the thirty-second monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions, and includes information relevant to the period from 22 April to 23 May 2016.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

5. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) With respect to the 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of 24, and three remain to be verified as destroyed. The security situation continues to prevent safe access to destroy the remaining aircraft hangar, which stands ready to accept the explosive charges, and to confirm the condition of at least one of the two stationary above-ground facilities. While it was reported previously that the Syrian Arab Republic was exploring the possibility to safely access the other stationary

facility, the frequently changing security situation has limited any plans to access that site.

(b) On 19 May 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its thirtieth monthly report (EC-82/P/NAT.3, dated 19 May 2016) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

(c) The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation in accordance with the implementation of subparagraph 1 (e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

6. As reported previously, all the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have now been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-81/DEC.4

7. At its Eighty-First Session, the Council (in decision EC-81/DEC.4) requested that the Director-General, in parallel with the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), meet with senior Syrian officials to address the issues identified by the Secretariat in the "Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/HP/DG.1, dated 22 February 2016).

8. In accordance with the Council's decision, the Director-General, together with the DAT, continues to engage senior Syrian officials in order to address the unresolved issues pertaining to the initial declaration and subsequent submissions regarding the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

9. Upon invitation of the Director-General, H.E. Dr. Faisal Mekdad, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, and a delegation of experts, participated in four days of consultations with staff from the Secretariat. Convened at OPCW Headquarters from 27 to 30 April 2016, the objective of the consultations was to discuss and resolve all outstanding issues indicated in the Secretariat's report.

10. Following these discussions, a delegation from the Secretariat will continue its technical consultations with Syrian officials in Damascus from 30 May to 3 June 2016. These consultations will focus on all issues that remain to be resolved, and will also include engagement on the most recent analytical results of samples collected by the DAT during its fourteenth visit to the Syrian Arab Republic, in January 2016. The results of analysis of the most recent samples have increased the scope of issues that remain to be resolved.

11. As decided by the Council at its Eighty-First Session, the Director-General will inform the Council of the outcome of these consultations in advance of its Eighty-Second Session, to be convened in July 2016.

Other activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

12. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat, on behalf of the Director-General, has continued to brief States Parties in The Hague on its activities.

13. Amendments to the agreements to extend the support provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to the OPCW mission until the end of November 2016 have been concluded. Such amendments will also allow UNOPS to provide logistical and administrative support to the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) on a reimbursement basis. It is noted that, as at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

14. With the modalities of cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW for the security of the remote monitoring systems already agreed upon, the contract for undertaking maintenance and repair of the systems installed at four of the CWPFs already destroyed (four underground structures) was finalised with the contractor during the reporting period.

Supplementary resources

15. As previously reported, a Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, such as those of the DAT. As at the cut-off date of this report, contribution agreements totalling EUR 7.8 million had been concluded with Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United States of America, and the European Union. Pledges from other donors have been made and are currently being processed.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

16. The FFM has continued to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and will be guided in its work by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), and United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015). The OPCW has also continued to extend its full cooperation and support to the JIM.

Conclusion

17. The main focus of the future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will be on the implementation of the Council's March 2016 decision (EC-81/DEC.4), as well as on the destruction and verification of the remaining aircraft hangar, confirmation of the status of the two stationary above-ground facilities, and annual inspections of the underground structures already verified as destroyed.

United Nations A/70/905–S/2016/495

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 23 May 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of April 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the identical letters dated 23 May 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 April 2016	0855	Opposite the town of Blida near point BP28, as an Israeli enemy patrol comprising four vehicles was passing, its soldiers threw a smoke bomb from opposite the above-mentioned point. The smoke bomb landed inside occupied territory.
9 April 2016	2320 2330	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy fired two flares over its Radar position.
10 April 2016	2315 2325	Three explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
16 April 2016	0242	From inside occupied territory near the Israeli enemy position opposite the town of Ramiya, two enemy Humvee vehicles approached. The passengers deliberately directed searchlights 20 metres into Lebanese territory for seven minutes.
17 April 2016	0225	Inside occupied territory, as an Israeli enemy Humvee vehicle was moving from its position in Birkat Risha to its position north of the Zar'it barracks, the passengers deliberately directed a searchlight 20 metres into Lebanese territory for 12 minutes.
23 April 2016	1510	An Israeli enemy Hummer vehicle mounted with surveillance cameras approached from inside the occupied town of Ghajar to an emplacement opposite the Lebanese Army Tallat al-Wazzani position. The vehicle pointed a camera at Lebanese territory.
25 April 2016	1320	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at point TP36 opposite the town of Udaysah, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and two Defender vehicles approached, and 15 soldiers disembarked, carrying maps. They photographed Lebanese territory and the Hummer vehicle pointed a 12.7 mm machine gun at Lebanese territory. The vehicles and soldiers left in the direction of occupied territory at 1350 hours.
26 April 2016	1000	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at the enemy Ruwaysah position opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, the Israeli enemy stationed a Raccoon Stalker vehicle with its surveillance camera pointed at Lebanese territory. The vehicle left in the direction of occupied territory at 1020 hours on 28 April 2016.
27 April 2016	0900	Opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, some 23 Israeli Army enemy soldiers and a dog crossed the technical fence opposite point B64. They searched the area between that point and point B65. They then violated the Blue Line at point B64 by some 10 metres for five minutes, covered by a Merkava tank stationed inside occupied territory. At 1110 hours, they threw two smoke bombs opposite point B64. The smoke bombs landed between the technical fence and the Blue Line. They left opposite point B64 at 1115 hours.
	1345	On the outskirts of the town of Shab'a in the Shahl area, opposite observation point OP2 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), an Israeli enemy foot patrol tried unsuccessfully to abduct the herder Mahir Hamdan, who fled with his livestock in the direction of the town of Shab'a.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 April	1208	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 500 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 22-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1210	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 500 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 20-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1250	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 555 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 20-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1250	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 555 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-hour-and-15-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
10 April	1754	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 129 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 April	1845	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 April	0353	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 314 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 10-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1904	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 370 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 April	1913	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 203 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
17 April 2016	0333	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 280 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a five-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 April 2016	1747	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 150 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2200	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
24 April 2016	2120 2125	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position off Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two periods of 30 seconds and one minute, respectively.
25 April 2016	1812	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011), proceeding some 277 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2005 2117	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for four periods of one minute, three minutes, 90 seconds and one minute, respectively.
	2014	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 408 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a five-minute period. It released two explosive charges into Lebanese territorial waters before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
26 April 2016	1819	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 174 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
27 April 2016	1918	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 240 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
28 April 2016	1815	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 260 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 April 2016	1817	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 180 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
30 April 2016	0225	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 222 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 April 2016	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1520 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1230	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0715 hours on 2 April 2016 over Rumaysh.
2 April 2016	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0500 hours on 3 April 2016 over Kafr Killa.
4 April 2016	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 April 2016	1100	Four Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1255 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2115 hours over Rumaysh.
7 April 2016	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over the west of Naqurah.
	1350	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2350 hours over Rumaysh.
8 April 2016	0640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf, the Western Bekaa, the South, Jubayl, Batrun, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1330 hours over Kafr Killa.
11 April 2016	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 April 2016	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1425 hours over the west of Naqurah.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2220 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
13 April 2016	2105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2220 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
15 April 2016	1400	An Israeli enemy crop sprayer violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over Udaysah, Markaba and Hula before leaving at 1430 hours in the direction of occupied territory.
17 April 2016	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
19 April 2016	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1356	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the Bayad position from east to west, where it violated the Blue Line near Blida. It circled over olive groves in Blida before leaving at 1357 hours over point BP-29.
20 April 2016	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1335 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0535 hours on 21 April 2016 over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 April 2016	1155	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2355 hours over Naqurah.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1705 hours over Rumaysh.
	2220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf and Iqlim al-Kharrub before leaving at 0100 hours on 22 April 2016 over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
22 April 2016	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1800 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 April 2016	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2045 hours over Kafr Killa.
24 April 2016	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 over Naqurah.
25 April 2016	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1940 hours over Naqurah.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1410 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over Jubayl, Kasrawan and Matn before leaving at 1435 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 April 2016	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1200	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They proceeded as far north as Beirut before leaving at 1215 hours over Rumaysh.
28 April 2016	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the North before leaving at 1520 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1255 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
29 April 2016	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1505 hours over Naqurah.

United Nations S/2016/496

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 May 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that starting at 10:00 a.m. on 2 June 2016, the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations will hold an open debate in the Security Council, within the framework of the Presidency of France, on the theme of "Sexual violence in conflict situations", with a particular emphasis on the link between sexual violence and human trafficking. The concept note for this event is annexed to the present letter (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as official documents of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**

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Annex to the letter dated 27 May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Concept note for the Security Council open debate on the theme "Conflict-related sexual violence: responding to human trafficking in situations of conflict-related sexual violence", 2 June 2016

1. Introduction

The month of June will be marked by the inaugural commemoration, on 19 June, of the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, which was approved by the General Assembly on the same day in 2015, in order to pay tribute to the survivors of sexual violence and to help them to speak out against this scourge.

The date of 19 June commemorates the breakthrough adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1820 (2008), in which the Council recognized sexual violence as a tactic of war and a threat to global peace and security, underscoring that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or constitutive acts with respect to genocide.

In the lead-up to the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, the open debate will help to raise awareness by promoting the role of women in addressing and preventing sexual violence in conflict, while focusing on a particularly worrisome pattern identified during the course of the past year and in recent months: the trafficking in persons, particularly women and girls, in situations of conflict-related sexual violence.

2. Background and key challenges

Key patterns of sexual violence as a tactic of war: the case of human trafficking for sexual purposes

- *Root causes — conflict and displacements*. In connection with the mass migration crisis driven by conflict and rising violent extremism, the Secretary-General, in his report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2016/361), deplores the deliberate threat and use of sexual violence as a form of persecution to displace populations such as in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and the Horn of Africa, with over 950,000 new refugees and migrants reaching Europe in 2015. Such displacements and cross-border activities have led to a rise in trafficking in persons for various sexual purposes, such as sexual slavery, prostitution, forced marriage, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or other forms of sexual violence.

- *Motivations for criminal or extremist groups*. Human trafficking is committed by non-State armed groups, in particular violent extremist and terrorist groups, in order to: (a) attract or compensate fighters — the promise of sexual access to women and girls has been used in Da'esh propaganda materials as part of its

recruitment strategy; (b) perpetuate the group — forced pregnancy or sterilization of trafficked women are part of a strategy to perpetuate the groups, for example, Boko Haram abducted and raped women and girls and forced them into marriage; and (c) generate revenue — groups have leveraged the threat of sexual violence to extract ransom payments from the families of abducted women and girls. Trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery or sexual exploitation therefore contributes to the funding and sustainment of criminal and terrorist groups. In January 2015 alone, Da'esh extorted $850,000 for the release of 200 abducted Yezidis; while in 2014, ransom payments to Da'esh from the Yezidi community amounted to between $35 million and $45 million (see S/2016/92 and S/2016/361).

- *Development of physical and virtual markets of trafficking*. This rising trend has turned sexual violence in conflict into a major cause of the development of criminal markets for trafficking. This trade occurs in both physical and virtual marketplaces, through the use of social media and communication technologies by criminal and violent extremist groups. This stresses even more the need for a strategic communication to counter the terrorist narrative online.

- *Consequences for survivors*. Women and children are often sold multiple times and are subjected to a variety of forms of sexual violence, which can cause deep, long-term physical and psychological trauma. Stigmatization and socioeconomic marginalization of victims may even increase the trauma or extend recovery periods. Local women's groups should be supported in their efforts to support survivors and to combat and prevent trafficking and participate in the development and implementation of anti-trafficking strategies.

Targeted groups trafficked for sexual purposes

- *Women and girls*. Abductions for the purposes of sexual slavery or forced marriage to combatants have increased, in particular through cross-border trafficking of Syrian and Iraqi women and children. An estimated 1,500 civilians may have been forced into sexual slavery. The trafficking and trading of women and girls is therefore part of a political economy of war and an ideological strategy of violent extremist groups.

- *Refugees and internally displaced persons*. Criminal infrastructure designed to exploit migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, particularly unaccompanied minors, trafficked for commercial sex and sexual slavery, have developed, thus increasing the risks for many refugees and asylum-seekers of renewed sexual violence. People smugglers are demanding sex as "payment of passage" before leaving a country or at checkpoints.

- *Women, children and unregistered births*. Women, who lack residency and work permits, and children who lack identity documents, are at greatest risk of exploitation. In particular, children born of rape who generally lack identity documents, risk reprisals and social marginalization due to their father's identity or affiliation. This is both a human rights and a security issue, as such children may face a heightened risk of radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups in the absence of other socioeconomic opportunities.

- *Minorities*. Women and children from targeted minorities, in particular the Iraqi Yezidi community, have been sold, traded, gifted to fighters, trafficked and held for ransom. Da'esh allegedly issued a "regulation" setting out the prices to be paid for Yezidi and Christian women and girls, the amounts varying according to age and other characteristics.

3. Recent normative developments in the Security Council

In the presidential statement on human trafficking adopted in December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/25), the Security Council identifies the link with sexual violence and stresses the need to deter, detect and disrupt trafficking in persons, in particular by violent extremist groups. It deplores such trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual slavery or sexual exploitation and reiterates the critical importance of implementing resolution 2195 (2014), in which it expresses concern, inter alia, that terrorists benefit from the trafficking of persons.

In its resolution 2253 (2015), on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, the Council condemns the abduction of women and children for sexual exploitation and trafficking and notes that any person or entity who transfers funds to ISIL directly or indirectly in connection with such exploitation would be eligible for listing by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011).

In its resolution 2242 (2015), on women, peace and security, the Council does not explicitly raise the issue of trafficking of women and girls, but expresses deep concern that acts of sexual and gender-based violence are known to be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups, used as a tactic of terrorism and an instrument to increase their power through supporting financing, recruitment and the destruction of communities (see S/2015/203).

4. Objectives and questions

The open debate aims to assess existing tools as well as gaps at the national, regional and international levels and to assess how to prevent and respond to sexual violence in conflict, in particular with regard to the issue of human trafficking. In this context, it is our collective responsibility to tackle these challenges: how can the participation of women and local women in civil society be promoted in the development of anti-trafficking and counter-terrorism strategies? How can the impact of sanctions against individuals and entities involved in trafficking for the purposes of sexual violence be improved? How can financial flows generated by trafficking for sexual purposes be curbed and controlled? How can peacekeeping missions better integrate the protection of civilians from trafficking for sexual purposes?

5. Format and speakers

The open debate will be held on 2 June 2016 at 10 a.m. in the Security Council Chamber. It will be chaired by the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.

The following speakers will brief the Security Council: the Secretary-General; the Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children; and the Founder and President of Zenab for Women in Development in Sudan, on behalf of the Non-Governmental Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Fatima Ahmed.

United Nations S/2016/497

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 May 2016

Original: English

Fifth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), in which the Council requested me to report and provide analysis to the Council on the usage and expenditure of the escrow accounts referenced in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution on an annual basis, with the first report no later than 31 March 2012, and the final report occurring three months after the transfer of any remaining funds retained for the purposes stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 to the Government of Iraq by 31 December 2016, unless otherwise authorized by the Council.

2. In previous years, commencing in 2012, I presented annual reports to you no later than 31 March, with analysis on the usage and expenditure for the preceding year, this being the date for the closing of the yearly United Nations accounts. However, the closing of the 2015 accounts has been delayed and, in consultation with the Board of Auditors, the time limit for the preparation of all financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2015 has been extended to the end of May 2016. Subsequently, and as reflected in my letter dated 22 March 2016 to you, I am submitting the report at this time.

II. Background

3. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 1958 (2010), the Secretariat transferred from the Iraq account: (a) $20 million to the administrative escrow account exclusively for the expenses of the United Nations related to the orderly termination of the residual activities of the oil-for-food programme, including the Organization's support to Member State investigations and Member State proceedings related to the programme, and the expenses of the office of the High-level Coordinator created pursuant to Security Council resolution 1284 (1999); and (b) $131 million to the indemnification escrow account for the indemnification of the Government of Iraq to the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors.

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III. Administrative escrow account

4. I should like to inform the members of the Security Council that the activities undertaken and funded as outlined in paragraph 4 of resolution 1958 (2010) from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015 have led to expenditure amounting to $640,000 for the activities related to the orderly termination of the residual activities of the oil-for-food programme.

IV. Indemnification escrow account

5. I should like to inform the members of the Security Council that no expenditures have been incurred to date in respect of the amount referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 1958 (2010).

6. Following my last report to the Security Council of 24 March 2015 (S/2015/208), the Secretariat met with the Government of Iraq to negotiate the implementing agreements as provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 1958 (2010). In this respect, I am pleased to report that substantial progress has been made on outstanding issues. It is my intention to inform the Council of further progress.

United Nations S/2016/498

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 May 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2227 (2015), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2016 and requested me to report on its implementation, focusing on progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and on the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. The present report provides an update on major developments in Mali since my report dated 28 March 2016 (S/2016/281), and contains recommendations for the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA, taking into account the findings and recommendations of the strategic review led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

II. Major political developments

A. Implementation of the peace agreement

2. During the period under review, some progress was made in the implementation of the peace agreement. However, overall the process remained behind schedule and many challenges continued to be encountered.

Political and institutional measures

3. On 28 March, the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) opened a four-day forum in Kidal, initially intended to conclude the cycle of intercommunal and intracommunal talks launched in Anéfis in October 2015. Contrary to the original plan, the Government and the Platform coalition of armed groups withdrew their participation, as the Government and signatory armed groups failed to reconcile their views on the objectives of the forum and the participation of the Government, even though it had contributed financially to it.

4. On 31 March, the National Assembly adopted a law revising the Code des collectivités territoriales. The law will pave the way for the establishment of interim administrations in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudenni and Timbuktu. Following a petition by opposition members of the National Assembly to annul the law, on 5 May, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law was in conformity with the Constitution. The President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, promulgated the law on 10 May.

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5. On 31 March, the Council of Ministers appointed the new Governor of Kidal. The Governor was sworn in on 5 May, while those appointed to head the newly established regions of Ménaka (formerly part of the Gao region) and Taoudenni (formerly part of the Timbuktu region) were sworn in on 31 March and 7 April, respectively. Owing to security and logistical challenges, the Governor of Taoudenni remains in Timbuktu, while the Governor of Kidal remains in Gao. As at 18 May, three of five of the Governors were deployed to their respective regions in the north, while the number of prefects stood at 53 per cent (17 of 32). The overall number of government officials absent from their duty stations at the subprefect level decreased from 49 per cent reported in my previous report to 32 per cent, owing mainly to the creation of the new regions. Four magistrates redeployed to jurisdictions in Gao and Timbuktu, with assistance from MINUSMA. On 7 April, a court opened in Gourma Rharous (Timbuktu region), increasing the number of functional jurisdictions in the region to three. On 27 April, the Council of Ministers made several key appointments, including at the level of prefect and subprefect, in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions.

6. Progress was also made with respect to the electoral calendar. On 12 April, the Minister of Territorial Administration announced the holding of communal elections on 25 September 2016; a constitutional referendum, during which the establishment of a senate would be proposed, in November 2016; and regional elections in the first semester of 2017. On 20 April, the Government issued a decree establishing a committee of experts for the revision of the Constitution.

7. On 25 and 26 April, the Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l'accord) held its eighth meeting in Bamako, during which its members stressed the need to accelerate the implementation of the agreement, particularly with respect to the interim administrations and security mechanisms. While the Government presented the measures that it had taken, including the creation of the Ménaka and Taoudenni regions and the review of the Code des collectivités territoriales, the signatory armed groups in a joint letter deplored the lack of progress on the establishment of the interim administrations, reiterating the need for further efforts on institutional issues before moving forward on security and defence aspects. They further deplored the delays in finalizing the development strategy for the northern regions, including the national emergency response plan.

8. MINUSMA continued to support the Ministry of National Reconciliation in the preparation of the Conférence d'entente nationale, planned for later in 2016. On 25 and 27 March, the Ministry of National Reconciliation, with support from MINUSMA, organized a conference on the theme "Consultations on Mali post-conflict", with more than 100 participants, resulting in recommendations on the implementation of the agreement for consideration at the Conférence d'entente nationale.

Defence and security measures

9. On 13 April, CMA provided to the Technical Commission on Security a preliminary list of 18,000 combatants for cantonment; the Platform has yet to provide its list. While a 2013 assessment projected a total of 6,000 combatants from both CMA and the Platform, the Government-led ad hoc working group on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration subsequently revised the total to 10,000 each in 2016. MINUSMA began the construction of five new cantonment

sites on 25 April in Ber (Timbuktu region), Tessalit (Kidal region) and Tin Fatimata (Gao region) and on 15 May in Ilouk and Tabankort (Gao region). On 20 May, MINUSMA completed the construction of the first three sites in Likrakar (Timbuktu region), Fafa (Gao region) and Inékar (Ménaka region), with support from the Peacebuilding Fund. All sites include special arrangements for female combatants.

10. Progress was made in the establishment of the Operational Coordination Mechanism, responsible for coordinating both mixed patrols and protecting cantonment sites, with the finalization of its concept of operations and the installation of its headquarters in Gao. On 8 April, the Government handed over 42 vehicles to the Mechanism for the launch of the mixed patrols, while four projects to equip its headquarters were approved through the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali. At the end of April, CMA and the Platform handed over lists of their personnel to join the mixed patrols in Gao, while those for Kidal and Timbuktu remained pending. The mixed patrols have yet to begin. MINUSMA military observers conducted a total of 351 patrols in the north. They also investigated 22 potential ceasefire violations, including eight joint investigations with the mixed monitoring and verification teams. They found no evidence of ceasefire violations.

11. On 18 May, the Council of Ministers approved a new draft decree on the National Council for Security Sector Reform, placing it under the authority of the Prime Minister. The National Council is of critical importance for the implementation of provisions of the agreement on cantonment; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; integration into the Malian defence and security forces of elements of signatory armed groups; and territorial police and local advisory committees on security. The signatory armed groups have not yet designated their representatives in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and integration commissions. On 7 April, the Ministry of Defence and Former Combatants, with support from MINUSMA, organized a workshop to discuss the integration of former combatants into the Malian defence and security forces.

B. Other political developments

12. The reporting period was marked by a number of developments within and between the signatory groups. On 21 March, the Front populaire de l'Azawad (FPA) — a splinter group of CMA — joined the Platform. On 7 April, the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) re-elected Bilal Ag Acherif as its Secretary-General at the conclusion of its third congress, held in Kidal.

C. Regional cooperation

13. Following the terrorist attack in Grand-Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, on 13 March, which left dozens of civilians killed or wounded, the Ministers of Interior and Security of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Senegal met on 23 and 24 March in Abidjan and agreed on measures to strengthen security cooperation in West Africa. Cooperation between the Ivorian and Malian authorities resulted in the arrest of 15 individuals, including three Malians, related to the terrorist attack in Grand-Bassam.

14. From 20 March to 1 April, the African Union undertook a preliminary assessment visit to Mali, with United Nations support, to review options aimed at addressing the non-permissive environment in which MINUSMA operates in northern Mali. The African Union Commission continued planning to undertake a further assessment involving the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the countries of the region and other partners. During a meeting held in Bamako on 5 and 6 May, the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger agreed to strengthen their security cooperation by focusing on information- and intelligence-sharing and enhancing border controls.

III. Major security developments

15. On 18 April, up to 500 demonstrators in Kidal, protesting the presence of international forces, breached the airstrip guarded by MINUSMA. The demonstration turned violent, leaving two protesters dead and nine injured. Airfield installations were seriously damaged by the demonstrators, further hindering the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the local population and MINUSMA operations. Two days later, another demonstration at the airport turned violent. MINUSMA uniformed personnel withdrew from the airport to prevent further escalation, as did CMA personnel deployed there. On 21 April, the organizers of the demonstrations presented a series of demands, including the cessation of alleged harassment and arbitrary detention by the French forces. On 29 April, after my Special Representative spoke with various interlocutors, the demonstrators vacated the airfield; CMA personnel, including an anti-terrorist unit of MNLA, resumed control of airfield security. A preliminary investigation by MINUSMA was unable to determine the circumstances of the two deaths; the Mission continues to investigate.

Asymmetric and other attacks

16. During the reporting period, complex attacks against the Malian defence and security forces, the French forces and MINUSMA continued to be perpetrated by violent extremist and terrorist groups. A total of 15 such attacks were reported against MINUSMA, mainly in the Kidal region, with 5 peacekeepers and 1 civilian contractor killed and 11 personnel injured. The previous reporting period had seen a total of 20 hostile acts, with 10 casualties and 61 injured. However, the attacks are increasingly complex and sophisticated, with a combination of roadside explosive devices and ambushes. On 18 May, along the Tessalit-Gao axis (Kidal region), an unknown number of assailants attacked a MINUSMA convoy with mortar and small arms fire after it had struck an improvised explosive device approximately 15 km north of Aguelhok, killing five peacekeepers and injuring three others. In addition, on 3 May, along the Gossi-Douentza axis (Timbuktu region), approximately 20 assailants attacked a MINUSMA convoy with small arms fire after it had hit an explosive device, injuring two peacekeepers. Nine attacks against the Malian armed forces and two attacks against French forces were reported, including on 12 April, when three French soldiers were killed after the lead vehicle of a convoy had hit a land mine in the Kidal region, in an attack later claimed by Ansar Eddine.

17. On 21 March, an attack was carried out against the Azalai Nord-Sud Hotel in Bamako, the headquarters of the European Union Training Mission in Mali. One assailant was killed by the guards, while three suspects were arrested in Bamako.

18. The French forces and the Malian armed forces conducted two joint counter-terrorism operations in the areas of Gourma (Timbuktu region) and Ansongo (Gao region), while the Malian armed forces conducted three counter-terrorism operations in the Mopti and Ségou regions, resulting in the arrest of at least 49 suspects. On 13 April, the Council of Ministers extended the national state of emergency until 15 July.

Protection of civilians

19. Armed banditry continued to constitute the most significant threat to civilians, accounting for 30 per cent of all reported incidents in Gao and in Mopti, respectively, and 40 per cent in Timbuktu. Violent extremist and terrorist groups continued to threaten and intimidate civilians, including civil servants and alleged informants of the Malian and international forces, in the central and northern regions.

20. Intercommunal violence decreased in the reporting period in Ménaka. In the Mopti region, tensions between some members of the Bambara and Fulani communities intensified and new self-defence groups reportedly emerged in Douentza and Konna. On 30 April, unidentified armed men attacked a vehicle in the vicinity of Malemana (Mopti region), resulting in the death of a deputy mayor of Dioura (Ténenkou circle) as well as the youth leader of the Bambara community. According to local authorities, since 30 April, violent clashes have resulted in at least 26 people killed (23 from the Fulani community) and the displacement of approximately 827 civilians of the Fulani community. On 5 May, a ministerial delegation arrived in Kareri commune in Ténenkou circle to assess the situation and contain the escalation of violence. Subsequently, a judicial investigation was launched, while Malian defence and security forces established a temporary presence in the area to appease the tension and facilitate the investigations into the events. Further to reports of violent clashes in my previous report, on 21 and 25 March, MINUSMA organized 16 sessions on peaceful coexistence, bringing together more than 500 civilians who had fled recent intercommunal conflict in Inékar (Ménaka region).

21. During the reporting period, MINUSMA police conducted 2,049 joint patrols with the Malian police in urban areas, while the MINUSMA Force continued to assume a robust and visible posture in the vicinity of Ansongo (Gao region), Kidal and Ménaka, as well as in Timbuktu region. The MINUSMA Force also conducted joint patrols with the Malian armed forces in the towns of Gao, Ménaka, Mopti and Timbuktu. The Mine Action Service sensitized 16,668 people about explosive hazards in conflict-affected areas in the central and northern regions and destroyed 386 explosive items.

IV. Human rights

22. The human rights situation continued to be of serious concern during the reporting period. MINUSMA documented violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law committed by the Malian defence and security forces, CMA, the Platform and other armed and violent extremist groups. A total of 96 cases of serious human rights violations and abuses were reported, with at least 131 victims identified, including 31 children, compared with 34 cases involving at

least 53 victims recorded the previous reporting period. The cases involved 7 instances of killing, summary execution and enforced disappearance; 3 instances of inhumane detention conditions leading to death; 13 instances of ill-treatment; 2 instances of recruitment of children; 30 instances of illegal detention; 18 instances of extortion and pillage; 1 instance of intimidation; and 22 instances of lack of due process as a result of ineffective investigation. The recruitment and use of children by armed groups, involving 29 children, was particularly concerning. MINUSMA documented in one of the instances listed above the recruitment of 27 children, including 14 girls and 13 boys, by the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs imghads et alliés (GATIA), part of the Platform coalition. There were other credible allegations of recruitment and use of children by GATIA.

23. During the reporting period, 103 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related charges, including 80 by the Malian defence and security forces in Bamako as well as in the Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions and 23 by international forces in the north. Fifteen of them were reportedly subjected to summary execution (3), torture (5) and ill-treatment (7) by the Malian forces. CMA continued to detain six Platform combatants, while the Platform continued to detain a CMA combatant. As at 18 May, MINUSMA identified 295 conflict- and terrorism-related detainees, including 5 children, held in State-run detention facilities throughout the country. The continued detention of children constitutes a violation of the Government's commitment of 1 July 2013 to hand over children detained for association with armed groups to civilian child protection actors.

24. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights established monthly working sessions with MINUSMA to review and address human rights violations documented by the Mission. The first meeting was held on 14 April. In a positive development in the fight against impunity, during criminal court hearings in Bamako and Mopti that began on 2 May, the Court sentenced a dozen individuals charged with serious crimes, inter alia, acts of criminal association and terrorism. Some of the individuals had been released within the framework of the confidence-building measures between the Government and the signatory armed groups during the period from 2013 to 2015. On 30 April, the Council of Ministers adopted a bill on the reform of the National Commission for Human Rights, which provides for greater financial autonomy and independence in accordance with the Paris Principles (see General Assembly resolution 48/134, annex).

25. From 11 to 17 April, my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict visited Mali, and agreed with the Malian authorities on a joint framework for cooperation and action in key areas such as access and provision of services; the fight against impunity; legislative reform and strengthening the justice system; and specific action plans for the army and police. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) documented, through its partners, 46 incidents of gender-based violence, compared with 78 incidents recorded for the previous reporting period.

26. On 24 March, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court confirmed the war crimes charge against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi in relation to the destruction of historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu.

V. Humanitarian situation

27. Criminality and the presence of violent extremist and terrorist groups remained major impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in central and northern Mali. Eleven security incidents involving humanitarian actors were reported, compared with four incidents in the previous period, of which three specifically targeted humanitarian actors. On 29 April, a humanitarian convoy of an international non-governmental organization was attacked in the Gao region, resulting in three humanitarian workers being injured. Damages caused to the Kidal airfield during the incident of 18 April affected aerial movements of humanitarian personnel to and from Kidal. Humanitarian actors continued, however, to provide assistance and to plan for a strengthened presence in the Kidal region.

28. The continued deterioration of the security situation in parts of the Mopti region and threats against local authorities, educators and students in the circles of Djenné, Douentza, Mopti, Ténenkou and Youwarou led to the closure of 25 per cent of schools in those areas. In the Ségou region, 20 primary and junior high schools temporarily closed and 2 permanently closed. UNFPA provided emergency obstetric and neonatal care to 5 district hospitals and 15 health centres, and provided 600 delivery kits, while the United Nations Children's Fund worked with implementing partners to provide immunization services in the Kidal region. In the Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, the World Health Organization and its partners vaccinated more than 1,454,000 children against polio.

29. The lack of investment in public infrastructure continued to constrain access to water and electricity. Although humanitarian actors had ensured permanent sources of safe community drinking water for up to 9,550 people of a total estimated population of 83,000 in Kidal, it is likely to be insufficient in the current drought conditions. In Ménaka, the urgent rehabilitation of boreholes and water systems in areas of return has yet to be addressed.

30. Since my last report (S/2016/281), the number of internally displaced persons remained at 52,000, of which an estimated 51 per cent were children and 25 per cent were women, while almost 145,000 Malian refugees remained in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger. On 7 April, the third meeting of the Tripartite Commission between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took place in Bamako, with CMA and the Platform as observers.

VI. Economic development, cultural preservation and the environment

31. Since my last report, progress in the delivery of peace dividends and the return of basic services to the north by the Government continued to be hampered by persistent insecurity, a lack of basic infrastructure, and the limited redeployment of government officials to the north, as well as delays in establishing the interim administrations. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team continued supporting the population, particularly in the central and northern regions. MINUSMA used quick-impact projects to deliver assistance such as the provision of potable water and solar-powered electricity kits to community health centres in Mopti and Timbuktu regions and livelihood support to women in Timbuktu region.

The Peacebuilding Fund, along with its implementing partners, including the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the International Organization for Migration and UNHCR, supported 625 income-generating activities in the Gao and Timbuktu regions. MINUSMA and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continued rehabilitating part of the World Heritage mausoleums in Timbuktu, with work on the Sankore and Sidi Yahia mosques starting on 15 April.

VII. Conduct and discipline

32. During the reporting period, no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were registered. For the allegation reported during the previous period, the Member State concerned conducted an investigation in Mali and concluded that it could not be substantiated. Nevertheless, the alleged perpetrator will be charged with disobedience and will not be accepted for deployment to any current or future United Nations peacekeeping operation. MINUSMA conducted seven sexual exploitation and abuse risk assessment visits to military camps to sensitize personnel about discipline and my zero-tolerance policy. In addition, the Mission continued to inform the public and partners about the expected standards of conduct for United Nations personnel, focusing on the implementation of my zero-tolerance policy, while stressing the importance of preventing sexual exploitation and abuse and reporting such cases.

VIII. Strategic review of Mali

33. An integrated strategic review mission was conducted from 14 to 20 March, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to assess the appropriateness of the mandate and configuration of MINUSMA three years after its deployment, taking into account political and security developments, including the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The strategic review team consulted a broad cross-section of stakeholders, including the Prime Minister, Modibo Keïta, government ministers and other officials, including the Speaker of the National Assembly; civil society representatives; political parties; the leadership of the signatory armed groups; members of the diplomatic community, including regional partners; the leadership and personnel of MINUSMA; and the United Nations country team. The strategic review team conducted field visits to Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu.

A. Findings of the strategic review

1. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

Political and institutional reforms

34. Progress on the political and institutional reforms in the agreement remained limited. The implementation of decentralization measures; the establishment of interim administrations; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; and security sector reform remained behind schedule. To address this situation, interlocutors urged the swift deployment of the governors for Kidal,

Ménaka and Taoudenni, as well as the support of international partners to install the interim administrations that should serve as a catalyst for advancing other provisions of the agreement, including on defence and security and the delivery of peace dividends. Interlocutors underlined that there would be no lasting and effective presence of State authority without the deployment of police, justice and corrections institutions to protect the population and ensure the rule of law.

35. Some interlocutors expressed high expectations regarding the holding of local and regional elections, as well as the revision of the Constitution. Others, particularly within the opposition and women and youth organizations, advocated for an inclusive process to bring on board key segments of the population and ensure that their concerns were duly taken into account. In this respect, they emphasized the importance of holding the envisaged Conférence d'entente nationale, calling for its preparatory process to begin urgently.

Defence and security provisions

36. Interlocutors emphasized the need for clear national strategies to take forward security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. They called upon the newly established commissions on integration and on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to expedite the elaboration of modalities for the process, as well as criteria for integrating combatants into the reconstituted national army. They stressed the urgent requirement to activate the Operational Coordination Mechanism and launch the mixed patrols, including to provide security for redeployed State and interim administrations, reverse the expansion of the violent extremist and terrorist threat and advance cantonment. This would require a substantial level of trust between the parties, as well as further consultations on security arrangements for cantonment and other defence and security provisions. As agreed at the meeting of the Technical Commission on Security on 13 April, the early integration, through the mixed units, of elements of the signatory armed groups into the Malian defence and security forces could serve as an interim measure to establish the minimum security conditions required to move forward with the implementation of other relevant provisions of the agreement, without prejudice to the anticipated plans of the two commissions, which should address long-term solutions.

37. Government officials were also of the view that enhancing coordination mechanisms with MINUSMA could facilitate the redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces to the central and northern regions, including by MINUSMA providing operational and logistical support and mentoring to Malian security institutions in areas of mutual deployment, complementing the work of the European Union Training Mission in Mali. Many interlocutors expressed the view that time was of the essence and that failure to provide tangible security and other dividends to the population would result in the further entrenchment and expansion of violent extremist and terrorist groups.

38. Concern was expressed at the intensification of banditry and intercommunal violence over the past year in the Mopti and Ségou regions owing to the limited presence of State institutions, hampering the delivery of basic services in remote areas. Together with intercommunal tensions and perceptions of political, social and economic marginalization, it provided fertile ground for the spread of self-defence militias and violent extremist groups, including the Front de libération du Macina

(FLM). In the first half of 2016, such groups were responsible for at least 64 incidents that resulted in 35 civilian casualties.

Reconciliation and justice

39. Many interlocutors noted that the mechanisms in the agreement in respect of reconciliation and justice could play a fundamental role in ensuring long-term peace and stability in Mali. However, uneven progress had been made. Both the Government and civil society expressed support for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry. Civil society also stressed the important role of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, while expressing disappointment at not being consulted on its membership. While stressing the need to continue to fight impunity, some interlocutors noted that, notwithstanding that releasing detainees had an important confidence-building effect, it also undermined the credibility of the justice system. Counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the Malian armed forces had led to human rights violations in certain communities, which compounded the communities' feeling of marginalization from the peace process. The ability of MINUSMA to monitor and investigate allegations of human rights violations has been adversely affected by the deteriorating security situation.

Humanitarian situation and economic development

40. Many interlocutors, in particular the representatives of civil society and traditional and religious leaders, expressed high expectations that the peace process and strengthened collaboration among the signatory parties would translate into the immediate delivery of basic services and improvement in the lives of the population. However, State institutions and services remained absent in large parts of the north, owing mainly to increasing insecurity. Although such insecurity also had an impact on humanitarian and development interventions, United Nations system agencies and other partners continued to deliver basic services where access was possible.

41. The Government has not yet finalized its strategy for the development of the north or the national emergency plan. As a result, the outcomes of the international conference for the economic recovery and development of Mali, held in Paris in October 2015, has not yet translated into tangible results. Mali's partners had pledged $3.6 billion for the period 2015 to 2017, including $722 million for the north. So far, they have disbursed $780 million in total, including $177 million for the north. The joint evaluation mission to the north conducted by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, in accordance with article 36 of the peace agreement, had estimated that $4.9 billion was required for the recovery of northern Mali over three years.

2. Ceasefire and overall security environment

42. While there have not been any violations of the ceasefire since August 2015, the overall security situation in Mali deteriorated significantly during the past year. Security incidents have increased in intensity and sophistication. Terrorist and violent extremist groups have improved their modus operandi, with a higher level of flexibility that allowed them to quickly adopt new techniques and tactics. These groups have enhanced their capacity to carry out attacks against public targets, as seen in the attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in November 2015 as well as in Ouagadougou and Grand-Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, the multiplicity

of armed groups, particularly in the north, as well as their complex and rapidly changing relationships, rendered the environment particularly volatile and unpredictable.

43. Malian and international forces continued to suffer casualties with a doubling in the number of attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups in northern Mali. Attacks have spread to the centre of the country, particularly in the Mopti region. Against this backdrop, the Government and a number of other Malian stakeholders stressed the need to enhance the mandate and posture of MINUSMA to enable it to better protect itself and implement its mandate. Acknowledging that United Nations peacekeeping operations are not well suited to conduct counter-terrorism operations, they called upon the United Nations and other partners to provide targeted logistical support to the Malian armed forces, in the light of the constraints they face.

3. Regional situation

44. Interlocutors highlighted the continued influence of regional developments on Mali, as well as the impact the situation in Mali had on the Sahel and West Africa regions. Particular concerns were expressed about the spread of violent extremist and terrorist groups and their linkages with organized criminal networks. Regional cooperation to address the terrorist threat increased following the attacks in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Bamako. Interlocutors welcomed existing initiatives to counter terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel, including in the context of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) and the African Union-led Nouakchott process. They also welcomed the support provided by the French-led Operation Barkhan to G5 Sahel countries. At the same time, interlocutors stressed that successfully addressing the scourge of terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel region would require long-term support and investment in cross-border security arrangements and the gathering and sharing of intelligence, as well as enhanced coordination.

IX. Proposed adjustments to the Mission

A. Mandate

45. Taking into account recent political and security developments in Mali, including the signing of the peace agreement, as outlined above, it is recommended that MINUSMA be extended for another year, until 30 June 2017, with its current mandate. To accelerate the next phase of the stabilization process, MINUSMA should, however, prioritize its support to the Government in the implementation of key provisions of the agreement, in particular those related to the gradual restoration and extension of State authority. The Mission should therefore focus on aspects outlined below, with some recommendations for adjustments to its mandate and posture, bearing in mind that its operational effectiveness would be contingent upon enhancing its capabilities and augmenting its uniformed and support components.

Political support, good offices and reconciliation

46. The Mission should continue to fully assume its role in assisting the parties to implement their commitments under the peace agreement. To do so, MINUSMA should enhance its support to the Agreement Monitoring Committee, including by

providing expertise to strengthen its secretariat and subcommittees. Furthermore, it is recommended that the Committee, with the support of the international mediation, appoint the independent observer provided for in article 63 to further support it and its mechanisms. MINUSMA should continue its efforts in support of electoral reform and preparations for local and regional elections, while also enhancing the inclusiveness of the peace process, particularly for women and youth, such as by supporting the convening of the Conférence d'entente nationale.

Restoration and extension of State authority

47. MINUSMA should continue to support the Government's efforts for the effective and gradual restoration and extension of State authority, including through the establishment of interim administrations, the operationalization of the two newly formed regions of Ménaka and Taoudenni. MINUSMA should also support the gradual redeployment, according to modalities to be jointly defined with the Government, of the Malian defence and security forces, including once they are reformed and reconstituted. MINUSMA should, in particular, support the expansion of State authority and the enhanced presence of the Malian defence and security forces in the Mopti region to prevent a further deterioration of the security situation; mitigate intercommunal tensions and address violent extremism; and facilitate the delivery of basic services.

Ceasefire monitoring, protection of civilians and stabilization

48. In the light of the threat environment and to enhance the posture of MINUSMA, consideration could be given to the mandate of the Mission, specifically confirming that MINUSMA can take all necessary means, in its areas of deployment and within its capabilities, to ensure that its areas of operation are not used for hostile activities of any kind that would prevent it from discharging its duties under its mandate, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. In doing so, MINUSMA should coordinate with the Government and international forces. MINUSMA should also continue to support the Malian authorities in protecting civilians, stabilizing the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the north of the country, including through long-range patrols, and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas. MINUSMA should continue to patrol, either independently or in coordination with the Malian armed forces, along key axes. To support the efforts of the Government, MINUSMA would develop tailored multidimensional responses to intercommunal tensions, taking into account local conflict dynamics.

Security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

49. To accelerate the resumption of security responsibilities by the State throughout its territory, MINUSMA should support the early integration of the mixed patrols — comprising elements from the Malian defence and security forces and the signatory armed groups — into the Malian defence and security forces, as an interim measure and without prejudice to the anticipated plans of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and integration commissions.

50. The Mission should also support the redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces by mobilizing the support of international partners to provide

training and equipment in areas to be determined in consultation with the Government and partners. Collaboration and intelligence-sharing should also be enhanced among the Malian armed forces, international partners and MINUSMA, as part of overall efforts to counter violent extremist groups. Any support provided to the Malian defence and security forces must be implemented in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.

51. It is recommended that the Government and MINUSMA elaborate detailed benchmarks, with timelines, for the gradual redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces to the north, which would trigger a review of the deployment of MINUSMA. As part of this effort, the Mission would consider gradually handing over some of its sites close to the Niger belt to the Malian defence and security forces in the coming two years.

Human rights and the rule of law

52. The Mission should continue to support the training of the Malian defence and security forces to promote the full respect of human rights standards when conducting counter-terrorism operations. The Mission should also focus on enhancing coherence between customary law and statutory law while building the capacity of national corrections and judicial actors.

Humanitarian assistance and projects for stabilization

53. The development component of the agreement is a key element of the peace process. The United Nations country team and MINUSMA should enhance their collaboration to ensure an integrated response to support the restoration and extension of State authority and the delivery of basic services. The Mission would focus on the political and security components of the agreement, while the United Nations country team, with its specialized expertise, would lead the Organization's efforts on the agreement's development aspects.

Regional cross-border and inter-mission cooperation

54. Cross-border and inter-mission cooperation remain key to enabling the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA by creating a more enabling environment for its operation. The Mission should therefore explore measures to enhance its coordination with regional security initiatives, as well as the security agencies of countries bordering Mali, including through the exchange of liaison officers. MINUSMA should also enhance its synergies and exchange of intelligence with regional security arrangements, including the African Union-led Nouakchott process and the G5 Sahel initiative, to more effectively address common security challenges and expedite the stabilization of Mali and the Sahel. MINUSMA should also strengthen its capacities in terms of regional analysis, in close coordination with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, including through the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, and other entities in the subregion.

55. The Mission should capitalize on the ongoing United Nations rapid response capability development under the inter-mission cooperation framework in West Africa to enhance its operations. In that context, and on the basis of an assessment of the threat environment, required tasks and available resources, it is proposed that the 650-troop strong quick reaction force, currently in the United Nations Operation

in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) be transferred to MINUSMA, following its withdrawal from UNOCI in March 2017. While the unit would remain primarily a MINUSMA asset, it is proposed that it could also operate in Liberia in the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation, under the same arrangements between UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, pursuant to resolutions 2162 (2014) and 2190 (2014), respectively. As mobility is essential to making this force effective, it is proposed that the UNOCI aviation unit of 85 personnel currently supporting it also be transferred. Consultations with the respective troop-contributing country, and subsequent modalities for transferring the unit to Mali, are ongoing, pending approval by the Security Council. I will report on the agreed modalities and the proposed concept of operations for the employment of this unit in my next progress report on the situation in Mali.

B. Capabilities, configuration and deployment

Military component

56. As at 18 May, the strength of the MINUSMA military component stood at 10,407 personnel, of which 1.78 per cent were women, representing 96 per cent of the authorized strength of 11,240 personnel. The Force comprised seven infantry battalions deployed in three sectors, force reserves, headquarters staff, enablers, support units and 40 military observers.

57. Enhancing the ability of the Mission to fulfil its mandate and adopt a more robust posture in an environment as insecure, inhospitable and complex as northern Mali requires adequate capabilities. As outlined in my prior report (S/2016/281), MINUSMA continued to lack key capabilities, such as an attack helicopter unit, a military medium-utility helicopter unit, a combat convoy battalion and a force protection unit. The MINUSMA Force remained underresourced in terms of armoured personnel carriers and continued to lack the requisite military staff officers with specialized expertise, including in intelligence and imagery analysis.

58. In addition, many of the Mission's infantry units continued to face serious challenges in meeting United Nations standards for contingent-owned equipment, with 12 units lacking major equipment and 7 units under 60 per cent of self-sustainment requirements. Given that northern Mali is the most lethal threat environment for improvised explosive devices in which any United Nations peacekeeping mission is deployed, improving the manoeuvrability and protection of the Force would require that contributing countries take urgent measures to meet their obligations under their respective memorandums of understanding by deploying the remaining armoured personnel carriers needed under the current Force requirements. In addition, almost half of the level I clinics run by troop-contributing countries are not fully compliant with United Nations standards. Efforts are under way, in consultation with troop-contributing countries, to identify innovative options for meeting the requirements, including by seeking bilateral partners to help fill gaps in essential equipment, including operation and maintenance training for major equipment.

59. The absence of the State in large parts of the north resulted in MINUSMA serving as a primary target for violent extremist groups. Accordingly, the Mission has been required to address its own safety and security challenges first, thereby restricting its ability to fully implement its mandate. The strategic review conducted

a thorough troop-to-task analysis, on the basis of the updated security and threat assessment and the limited deployment of the Malian defence and security forces.

60. In sector north, the first priority is the deployment of the outstanding capacities to sustain the logistic supply and provide escalation dominance and robust protection and air mobility for quick reaction and casualty evacuation (combat convoy battalion, attack and utility helicopters). In addition, sector north still lacks a dedicated intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability to fill the information gap with regard to providing warning for hostile action and gaining insight into local conflict dynamics.

61. In sector west, violence has spread southwards into the Mopti and Ségou regions. The attacks have been associated with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun and FLM. There is potential to prevent and reverse the spread of instability with the support of MINUSMA before the influence of violent extremist groups takes root and, with the right measures, the State can regain legitimacy. The situation in Timbuktu is relatively stable; however, the security situation in the Goundam-Leré-Ber belt is deteriorating.

62. It was concluded that the current strength, capabilities and deployment of the MINUSMA Force, even with outstanding capability gaps addressed, is insufficient in the current security situation, given the need for greater mobility, manoeuvrability and self-protection. An augmentation was considered necessary to better enable the Mission to implement its mandate, including with respect to the protection of civilians and support to the redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces to the north as part of its exit strategy.

63. It is therefore recommended that the strength of the military component be increased by 2,049 personnel, bringing the authorized strength to 13,289. The additional personnel would include: (a) 150 special forces in Timbuktu that would contribute to intelligence-gathering and extending the range of operations; (b) an explosive ordnance disposal company of 140 personnel in Timbuktu to enhance protection; (c) an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance company of 115 personnel in Kidal; (d) 135 personnel for enhancement to sector and Force headquarters and existing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units; (e) 200 personnel to augment the combat convoy battalion to improve logistic supply to the north; (f) 20 staff officers for a new command post in Mopti to provide tactical mobility and emergency response, including evacuation; (g) a 650-troop strong quick reaction force and an aviation unit of 85 personnel; and (h) 554 troops to cover extra manpower for a pledged unit, owing to higher requirements by the contributing countries with respect to self-sustainment, force protection and/or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements. To enhance the Mission's intelligence capacity, all military personnel and units engaged in intelligence and information management will be reinforced and streamlined into a structure directly under the authority of the Force Commander.

French forces

64. In its resolution 2227 (2015), the Security Council authorized the French forces, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat, if requested by the Secretary-General.

Police component

65. As at 18 May, the police strength of MINUSMA stood at 1,145 personnel, including 276 individual police officers, of whom 35 were women, and 869 formed police unit officers, of whom 41 were women, of an authorized strength of 1,440 personnel, including 320 individual police officers and 1,120 officers in eight formed police units. Formed police units are deployed in Bamako, Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu; one is currently deploying to Gao; and one platoon is temporarily in Douentza. The remaining unit is tentatively scheduled to deploy to Goundam in August.

66. On the basis of the evolving security situation and continuing challenges facing Malian law enforcement agencies, it was concluded that the current police strength of MINUSMA was insufficient to fully implement its mandate. It is therefore recommended that the Mission's police strength be increased by 480 personnel, including three additional formed police units and 60 individual police officers, bringing the total authorized police strength to 1,920 personnel. It is also recommended that formed police units be deployed to Ménaka and Mopti, with the third unit in Bamako to serve as a reserve for rapid deployment to the regions, while also being available for joint patrols with the national police in Bamako, if requested by the Malian authorities. All formed police units would need to increase the average number of armoured personnel carriers from 6 to 10, in the light of the threat environment. The individual police officers would expand co-location to enhance mentoring and advisory support for specialized units of national law enforcement agencies, including supporting the establishment of transnational organized crime and counter-terrorism units in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu.

67. MINUSMA will also make adjustments within its current strength, including by establishing a special intervention team of 30 officers in Bamako to support crisis response. Efforts are also under way to deploy a police riverine capacity to enhance the protection of civilians and provide operational support to the Mali security forces in countering transnational organized crime on the Niger River.

Civilian component

68. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 69/289 A and B, MINUSMA has 1,713 civilian posts, including 801 national posts, 740 international posts and 172 United Nations Volunteers. As at 18 May, 86 per cent of civilian staff, of which 25 per cent were women, were deployed.

69. To ensure that the staffing structure of MINUSMA optimally addresses both substantive and support requirements, a civilian staffing review will be conducted after the adoption of the next resolution on MINUSMA to ensure full alignment with the new mandate. Given the magnitude of support challenges in Mali, consideration may be given to temporarily increasing the strength of the support component until the Mission reaches full operational capacity.

Support considerations

70. The Mission faces unique and serious challenges in meeting its logistical and support requirements, as a result of the vast and inhospitable terrain in Mali, as well as the challenging security environment. The MINUSMA Force continued its efforts to secure the main supply routes by conducting 25 escorted logistics convoy

missions during the reporting period. However, the delayed deployment of the combat convoy battalion and the shortfall in armoured personnel carriers and other mine-protected vehicles continued to limit logistical support to the MINUSMA bases in the north. Damages caused to the Kidal airfield negatively affect the United Nations logistical and operational capacities in the region. Rehabilitation work is estimated to cost between $1.7 and $2.1 million and will commence only after the clearing of explosive ordnance devices and once security measures are in place.

71. To further streamline the supply chain and facilitate more efficient and effective movement of goods to the northern and western sectors, it is recommended that the main logistics hub be relocated from Bamako to Gao and the route through Benin and the Niger be used as an additional supply route, which will be substantially shorter than transporting goods from Dakar to Gao and Kidal, as is currently the case. This would entail relocating the majority of civilian logistics personnel from Bamako to Gao. A secondary logistics hub would be maintained in Bamako to facilitate the transport of cargo to sector west.

Safety and security of personnel

72. The general insecurity in the north, in particular the continued deadly attacks against MINUSMA, raises significant concerns relating to the safety and welfare of United Nations personnel. While the continued effectiveness of security operations remains a primary concern, the Secretariat will work closely with troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure that responsibilities to provide for the welfare of deployed personnel are met, and that options available to the Secretariat to support the rotation of contingent personnel more frequently than the standard of every 12 months, in cases of high operational tempo, and the targeting of peacekeepers are considered. Other welfare programmes are being implemented to mitigate the high levels of stress for civilian staff in Kidal and Tessalit.

73. Considerable potential remains for the further integration of technology and intelligence to enhance the security of MINUSMA personnel, installations and assets, while also deploying additional resources, including an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance company to Kidal, as proposed in paragraph 63 above. The Mission would also need to enhance its capability to conduct day and night emergency medical evacuation, requiring two additional specialized helicopters with night vision capability; emergency air medical teams in Mopti and Tessalit; and four medical teams in Aguelhok, Douentza, Leré and Ménaka.

X. Financial considerations

74. My budget proposal for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 amounting to $945.5 million gross is currently before the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly for review and consideration. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSMA beyond 30 June 2016, and approve my recommendations contained in paragraphs 45 to 73 above, it is my intention to seek additional resources for the operation of the Mission from the General Assembly during the main part of its seventy-first session.

75. As at 26 May 2016, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to $79 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,372.6 million.

76. Reimbursement of troop/formed police costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2016, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2015, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XI. Observations

77. One year after the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation by the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups, and three years into the deployment of MINUSMA, Mali has come a long way on the path to stabilization. I commend the leadership role played by President Keïta and the leaders of the signatory armed groups who have managed, over the past year, to sustain a political dialogue that has been conducive to some progress on political and institutional reforms, as well as the effective cessation of hostilities, since the conclusion of the talks held in Anéfis in October 2015.

78. I acknowledge in particular the commitment made by President Keïta and the leaders of the signatory armed groups, on 27 February, to agree on a new timeline for the implementation of the key institutional and security provisions in the peace agreement. This, in itself, is an acknowledgement that the challenges for the implementation of the agreement are daunting, and that progress made so far has been uneven. The political and institutional reforms, notably those related to decentralization, security sector reform and the rule of law, offer a historical opportunity to bring a sustainable solution to the longstanding governance and security challenges that lie at the core of the Malian crisis. I therefore remain concerned by the continuing delays in the implementation of the agreement and share the feeling of urgency expressed by Malian and international stakeholders alike.

79. The onus is on the Malian stakeholders to redouble efforts to accelerate the implementation of the agreement. I recall, once again, their commitment under article 50 of the agreement to implement it in good faith and to work towards its full implementation. I welcome the appointment of the three Governors for the Kidal, Ménaka and Taoudenni regions, and the promulgation of the law revising the Code des collectivités territoriales, which constitute important milestones for the gradual restoration and extension of State authority.

80. The slow progress in the activation of the defence and security provisions in the agreement, including the mixed patrols and the cantonment, the delayed restructuring of the security sector and the continued absence of law enforcement institutions in a large part of the Malian territory, have significantly contributed to the deterioration of the security environment in the north. The Government and the signatory parties are now confronted with the urgent need to engage in a "race against the clock" to reverse the determination of the terrorist and violent extremist groups to derail the implementation of the agreement.

81. I call upon the Government and the signatory armed groups, with the support of MINUSMA and other partners, to capitalize on the recent creation of the integration and disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion commissions and on progress on political reforms to accelerate the cantonment process, launch the operationalization of the mixed patrols, as well as the special units, and provide security for the gradual extension of State authority to the north. I also call upon the Government to engage in a genuine dialogue with the signatory groups, with the

support of international partners, with a view to agreeing on the modalities for the integration of elements of signatory armed groups within the reconstituted Malian defence and security forces to enable progress on cantonment and the establishment of the mixed units and the mixed patrols.

82. In that context, I urge the Government, in close coordination with MINUSMA and other partners, including the European Union military and police training missions in Mali, to define a road map for the gradual extension and redeployment of the reformed and reconstituted Malian armed forces, as well as law enforcement, justice and corrections capacities, as the most appropriate response to the rise of terrorism and violent extremism in the country. While the Government should continue leading the reform of the Malian security institutions, I encourage the international community to increase its support to further strengthen the capacities of the Malian armed forces, particularly by providing training, equipment and mentoring.

83. It is my firm belief that without urgent progress on the defence and security provisions of the agreement, the Government and the signatory armed groups will continue to face significant strategic reversals affecting the security environment in the northern, central and southern regions of Mali, as demonstrated by the terrorist attack against a MINUSMA convoy on 18 May, during which five peacekeepers were killed. I strongly condemn the cowardly attacks against civilians, signatory armed groups, the Malian and French forces and MINUSMA. I reiterate that attacks targeting United Nations peacekeepers constitute war crimes under international law and that all perpetrators, organizers, financers and sponsors of terrorist acts must be brought to justice in accordance with international law. I also express my heartfelt condolences to the bereaved families and the Governments of those concerned, as well as to the people and Government of Mali who continue to suffer unconscionable losses. I urge all Malian parties to refrain from violent action and to condemn the use of children as human shields. In that context, I again condemn the events of 18 April in Kidal that exemplify the fragility of the peace process as well as the lack of commitment of some actors. I deeply regret the loss of life and reiterate the commitment to provide full clarity on what transpired.

84. I remain extremely concerned by the expansion of attacks by violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Mopti and Ségou regions, where Malian security and law enforcement agencies are facing increased threats that have also hampered the operations of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other partners in the area. While commending the Malian authorities for launching counter-terrorism operations in those regions, I call upon the Government to ensure that any response is undertaken in full compliance with its international human rights obligations. I am concerned about allegations of human rights violations being committed in the course of such operations, further alienating already marginalized communities. The fight against terrorism must not infringe upon basic human rights and fundamental freedoms or aggravate the marginalization of certain communities. I emphasize, once again, that human rights violations committed in the name of countering violent extremism will give terrorists their best recruitment tools.

85. It is also important to continue to fight impunity and address long-standing grievances of local communities, including regarding the inclusiveness of the peace process. I call upon the Government and signatory armed groups, with the support of international mediation, to promote the broad involvement of all Malian stakeholders in the peace process, including through sustained political dialogue,

more proactive outreach initiatives and enhanced participation by women and youth. The convening of the Conférence d'entente nationale will play an important role. I also call upon the Government to continue to work closely with MINUSMA and other partners to operationalize the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, whose structures in the regions should contribute to bringing justice and reconciliation closer to local communities.

86. I am encouraged by the resolve demonstrated by the Malian leadership to curb the expansion of violent extremism, including through the endorsement of the five priorities under the Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism Initiative for Mali, namely the strengthening of the judicial system, the coordination of terrorism-related issues at the national and regional levels, security sector reform, the enhancement of border security and the prevention of violent extremism. MINUSMA will support the Government in the implementation of this initiative with financial support from the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre.

87. The return of basic services and the establishment of income-generating activities remain critical to addressing continuing humanitarian concerns and unemployment, particularly among youth and former combatants who are vulnerable to radicalization. I strongly encourage the Government to sustain its efforts to expand the coverage of basic social services in the central and northern regions to ensure that conflict-affected communities benefit from the long-awaited dividends of peace. MINUSMA will continue to deepen its engagement with the United Nations country team so as to ensure an effective complementarity of efforts, an early transfer of responsibilities, as appropriate, and the rapid delivery of basic services to the most vulnerable areas of the country, in full respect of humanitarian principles.

88. Security and stability in Mali is inextricably linked to that of the Sahel and West Africa regions, as evidenced by the recent terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, as well as the continued instability in some countries of the Sahel. The stabilization of Mali will only be possible with the strong and effective engagement of the countries of the region, as such threats cannot be contained by borders. I welcome the commitment by regional leaders to work closely together to this end, in particular at a time when the United Nations is adapting its peacekeeping footprint in the region. The ongoing security initiatives spearheaded by the African Union, ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel are important mechanisms to bring together relevant stakeholders and operationalize this commitment. I underscore the importance of enhanced regional ownership of such initiatives. I encourage bilateral and multilateral partners to increase their support to these organizations and initiatives, including with the provision of financial and logistical assistance, so as to enhance the region's collective efforts to more effectively combat terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organized crime. I encourage further collaboration by the countries of the region to reinforce collaboration with the Government of Mali and MINUSMA on issues related to border security and intelligence-sharing as well as through the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. MINUSMA will continue to play its role in accordance with its mandate and to enhance its support to these regional initiatives.

89. Looking ahead, I intend to keep the rapidly evolving political and security landscape under close review, while continuing to ensure that MINUSMA is appropriately resourced and positioned to achieve its priority objectives. I will continue to engage with the Government to develop realistic and credible

benchmarks towards the gradual establishment and extension of State authority that would help better sequence the engagement, priorities, posture and footprint of MINUSMA in the months and years ahead, bearing in mind the timelines in the agreement for major institutional reforms, as well as the presidential elections scheduled for 2018. This could also be helpfully framed by a shared vision of the Mission's end state.

90. My Special Representative will continue to use his good offices to proactively engage with the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups to that effect, and to overcome potential obstacles in rolling out the key political, institutional and security reforms in the agreement. In close coordination with international mediation, MINUSMA will also continue to play a key role in the strategic coordination of the dialogue between the Government and international partners on issues related to the implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, the Mission will deepen its support for the activities of the Agreement Monitoring Committee and other mechanisms set forth in the agreement, while calling upon the Committee to seriously consider the appointment of the independent observer.

91. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINUSMA for a period of one year, until 30 June 2017, with an authorized strength of up to 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel, while reprioritizing the mandate of MINUSMA, as outlined in paragraphs 45 to 73 above, in particular those related to the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities and assets, the protection of civilians and the implementation of stabilization tasks.

92. In addition to the recommended adjusted mandate and strength, it remains critical that MINUSMA urgently address outstanding gaps in force requirements, enhance its capabilities, including intelligence and the use of technologies, and continue to adjust its posture to be responsive to the deteriorating security situation. Such measures would better enable MINUSMA to implement its mandate. I urge all Member States that have pledged uniformed personnel and assets to MINUSMA, or are providing support to MINUSMA troop- and police-contributing countries, to accelerate the deployment of any pending personnel and materiel. I also urge the rapid deployment of any additional military and police capabilities, should the Security Council so authorize. I commend all MINUSMA contributing countries for their continued support in pursuit of peace, including the unprecedented contribution extended by European troop- and police-contributing countries, for the pledges that they have made in support of MINUSMA.

93. Lastly, I wish to express my gratitude and full support to my Special Representative for Mali, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, for his tireless efforts. I wish to pay special tribute to the civilian and uniformed men and women of MINUSMA for their dedication and contribution to Mali under extremely difficult circumstances. I also express my gratitude to the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners, many of which have been serving under difficult conditions and facing grave threats in a hostile environment, for their contribution in support of peace and stability in Mali.

Annex

Military and police strength of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as at 30 April 2016

	Military component (staff officers and units)			*Police component*								
				Individual police officers			*Formed police units*			*Total police*		
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Albania												
Algeria												
Argentina												
Armenia	1		1									
Australia	5		5									
Austria												
Bangladesh	1 445		1 445				139		139	139		139
Belgium	7		7									
Benin	258		258	26	1	27	140		140	166	1	167
Bhutan	3		3									
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)												
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2		2									
Botswana												
Brazil												
Brunei Darussalam												
Bulgaria												
Burkina Faso	1 691	29	1 720	24	3	27				24	3	27
Burundi				13		13				13		13
Cambodia	192	13	205									
Cameroon	3		3	16		16				16		16
Canada												
Central African Republic												
Chad	1 443		1 443	4		4				4		4
Chile												
China	387	15	402									
Colombia												
Congo												
Côte d'Ivoire	4		4									
Croatia												
Cyprus												

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Czech Republic	1		1									
Democratic Republic of the Congo				5	1	6				5	1	6
Denmark	17	1	18									
Djibouti				1		1				1		1
Dominica												
Dominican Republic												
Ecuador												
Egypt	68		68									
El Salvador	98	4	102									
Estonia	1		1									
Ethiopia	1		1									
Fiji												
Finland	4		4									
France	22		22	9		9				9		9
Gabon												
Gambia	4		4									
Germany	129		129	16	3	19				16	3	19
Ghana	219		219									
Greece												
Grenada												
Guatemala												
Guinea	847	6	853	7	3	10				7	3	10
Guinea-Bissau	1		1									
Honduras												
Hungary												
Iceland												
India												
Indonesia	140	4	144									
Ireland												
Israel												
Italy	1		1									
Jamaica												
Japan												
Jordan	1		1	1		1				1		1
Kazakhstan												
Kenya	3	4	7									
Kyrgyzstan												

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Latvia	1		1									
Lesotho												
Liberia	47	2	49									
Libya												
Lithuania												
Luxembourg												
Madagascar				2		2				2		2
Malawi												
Malaysia												
Mauritania	5		5									
Mongolia												
Montenegro												
Morocco												
Mozambique												
Namibia												
Nepal	146	4	150									
Netherlands	442	30	472	16	3	19				16	3	19
New Zealand												
Niger	856	6	862	13	12	25				13	12	25
Nigeria	65	13	78	2		2	108	31	139	110	31	141
Norway	72	9	81									
Pakistan												
Palau												
Papua New Guinea												
Paraguay												
Peru												
Philippines												
Poland												
Portugal	3		3									
Qatar												
Republic of Korea												
Republic of Moldova												
Romania	1		1	2		2				2		2
Russian Federation												
Rwanda												
Samoa												
Senegal	656	10	666	16	2	18	276	4	280	292	6	298
Serbia												

Country	Military component (staff officers and units)			Police component								
				Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Sierra Leone	7		7									
Singapore												
Slovakia												
Slovenia												
South Africa												
Spain												
Sri Lanka												
Sweden	213	21	234	2	3	5				2	3	5
Switzerland	4		4	3		3				3		3
Tajikistan												
Thailand												
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia												
Timor-Leste												
Togo	921	15	936	3		3	134	6	140	137	6	143
Tunisia				46	1	47				46	1	47
Turkey				3		3				3		3
Uganda												
Ukraine												
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2		2									
United Republic of Tanzania												
United States of America	9		9									
Uruguay												
Vanuatu												
Yemen	7		7	9		9				9		9
Zambia												
Zimbabwe												
Total	**10 455**	**186**	**10 641**	**239**	**32**	**271**	**797**	**41**	**838**	**1 036**	**73**	**1 109**


MINUSMA
Deployment
as at 15 May 2016
MAURITANIA
ALGERIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
GHANA
TOGO
COTE D'IVOIRE
GUINEA
SENEGAL
MALI
Sector NORTH
Sector EAST
Sector WEST
KIDAL
GAO
TOMBOUCTOU
MOPTI
SEGOU
KOULIKORO
KAYES
SIKASSO
Bamako
Gao
Kidal
Tombouctou
Mopti
Segou
Koulikoro
Kayes
Sikasso
Ansongo
Menaka
Douentza
Diabaly
Niono
Nara
Diema
Kolokani
Kati
Kolondieba
Yanfolila
Bougouni
Kadiolo
Yorosso
Koutiala
Kita
Kenieba
Nioro du Sahel
Aguelhok
Tessalit
Ber
Goundam
Lere
Youwarou
Douentza
Bandiagara
Sevare
Dire
Niafunke
Banamba
Dioila
Fana
San
Macina
Ouagadougou
Kano
Abidjan
Yamoussoukro
Man
Daloa
Korhogo
Odienne
Boundiali
Ferkessedougou
Tengrela
Sikasso
Freetown
Conakry
Bissau
Bamako
Gao
Kidal
Tombouctou
Mopti
Segou
Koulikoro
Kayes
Sikasso
Ansongo
Menaka
Douentza
Diabaly
Niono
Nara
Diema
Kolokani
Kati
Kolondieba
Yanfolila
Bougouni
Kadiolo
Yorosso
Koutiala
Kita
Kenieba
Nioro du Sahel
Aguelhok
Tessalit
Ber
Goundam
Lere
Youwarou
Douentza
Bandiagara
Sevare
Dire
Niafunke
Banamba
Dioila
Fana
San
Macina
Ouagadougou
Kano
Abidjan
Yamoussoukro
Man
Daloa
Korhogo
Odienne
Boundiali
Ferkessedougou
Tengrela
Sikasso
Freetown
Conakry
Bissau

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Security Council

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Note verbale dated 31 May 2016 from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations has the honour to transmit a letter dated 30 May 2016 from Stéphane Dion, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada, to the President of the Security Council (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Canada respectfully requests that the present letter and its annex be issued as a document of the Security Council and circulated to all members of the Council.

16-08891 (E) 030616

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Annex to the note verbale dated 31 May 2016 from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, concerning the desperate situation of civilians in Iraq and Syria, who have suffered, and continue to suffer, unimaginable atrocities at the hands of so called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

We are alarmed by evidence that suggests that ISIL may have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Iraq and Syria. These atrocities must be investigated and a legal determination made by a competent court. The perpetrators of these crimes must be held to account.

Canada stands in solidarity with the victims of the crimes committed by ISIL. Among many horrific abuses is the deliberate targeting by ISIL of women and girls from religious and ethnic minorities for rape, sexual enslavement and forced marriage. We are equally outraged by acts of violence against individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The impacts are devastating for the survivors as well as for their families and communities, and will endure long beyond the end of the conflict. ISIL is also deliberately targeting civilians in deadly bombing attacks. We strongly condemn the abuses committed by ISIL and its blatant disregard for the lives and well-being of civilians in Iraq and Syria.

In March 2015, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report which concluded that there is evidence to suggest that ISIL may have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Iraq. The report called for an independent investigation and for the Security Council to consider referring the situation to the International Criminal Court. The Government of Canada agrees with the recommendations made in the report.

Recently, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, Ján Kubiš, in a briefing, informed the Security Council that, so far, more than 50 mass graves have been discovered in areas of Iraq liberated from ISIL control. He called upon the international community to take steps to ensure the accountability of members of ISIL for the atrocious crimes perpetrated. In addition, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, Mohamed Ali Alhakim, urged the Council to set up a specific legal mechanism for investigating and bringing to justice the criminals of ISIL. It is certain that, without accountability, there will be no sustainable peace in Iraq and Syria.

We therefore ask the Security Council to act in accordance with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by establishing a mechanism for investigating reports of violations of international law by ISIL in Iraq and Syria, for determining whether these violations constitute acts of genocide or other serious international crimes and for identifying the perpetrators of such violations and measures to ensure accountability for the crimes perpetrated by ISIL in Iraq and Syria, including a referral to the International Criminal Court, as appropriate.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council and circulated to all members of the Council.

(*Signed*) Stéphane **Dion**